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ARTICLES & ESSAYS
Medicare Advantage, Accountable Care Organizations, and
Traditional Medicare: Synchronization or Collision?
Thomas L. Greaney*
INTRODUCTION
Despite its size and immense influence over health care in America, Medicare
today is no monolith. It is comprised of three distinct payment programs though
which it provides services to beneficiaries: "traditional," fee-for-service (FFS)
Medicare; Medicare Advantage (MA); and the Medicare Shared Savings and
Pioneer accountable care organizations (ACO) programs. These models, which
strongly influence provider delivery arrangements and program costs, differ
significantly along many dimensions important to beneficiaries and providers. In
the wake of changes spurred by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the evolution
of the health care delivery system, all three are evolving rapidly and subject to
regulation that will affect their interaction with each other. It is not clear whether
their paths will eventually cross and, if so, whether they will link together or
collide.
What is clear is that regulations affecting payment, quality, and delivery
methods for each model will influence their success and interplay with each other.
Navigating this dynamic terrain, Medicare's overseers, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) and Congress, have choices to make. They may find
useful guidance in a roadmap being developed by MedPAC, the independent
agency that advises Congress on Medicare payment policies. That proposal,
analyzed in this essay, would "synchronize" payment, quality and risk adjustment
rules to assure a level playing field for the three payment options. Eliminating
subsidies that tip the scale in favor of one model is an appropriate albeit
tremendously complicated technical task as diverse regulations apply to the three
models. However, this undertaking involves policy judgments that extend beyond
making technical adjustments to payment rules. Further, achieving a completely
neutral payment policy, to the extent that is even possible, will run afoul of a
number of entrenched and often conflicting norms that underlie Medicare policy.
* Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Co-Director Center for Health Law Studies, Saint
Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Rachel Polzin for research assistance and to Abbe Gluck
and the organizers and participants in the Medicare and Medicaid at 50 Symposium at Yale Law
School.
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I. MEDICARE'S THREE PAYMENT MODELS
A. Fee-for-Service (Traditional) Medicare
Borrowing from the design of indemnity insurance plans offered by Blue
Cross and Blue Shield at the time of its enactment, Medicare initially reimbursed
hospitals for their "reasonable costs" and physicians for their "reasonable
charges"' for all "medically necessary" care.2 Although myriad adjustments have
been made, including prospective payment for hospitals and other facility
reimbursement and fee schedule payments for physician services, the fundamental
structure of "traditional Medicare" under Parts A and B remains rooted in paying
providers for the volume of services they provide, regardless of quality or
outcomes. A near unanimous consensus among politicians and policy experts lays
the blame for Medicare cost and related problems of quality and fragmentation in
the delivery of care on the skewed incentives associated with FFS payment.
3
Equally problematic is the fact that because Medicare payment policy strongly
influences commercial insurance, fee-for-service payment has long persisted in the
private sector. Finally, the separation of physician and hospital payments promotes
major inefficiencies. Not only are payment incentives for quality-improving
coordination of care lacking, but hospitals are hamstrung in efforts to control costs
because staff physicians, paid on a FFS basis even for practice in the hospital, have
no financial incentives to make decisions that will reduce hospitals' costs. In some
cases, the effects are especially perverse: physicians may be reimbursed at higher
rates when employed by hospitals than when doing the same procedures as
independent practitioners, thus giving hospitals a financial incentive to employ
physicians and share the higher reimbursements with them.
4
Attempts to improve upon the administered pricing mechanisms for provider
reimbursement under Medicare have had at best mixed results. Inpatient
prospective payment to hospitals has had some success in reducing the length of
1. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 102a, 1814(b), 1832(a)(1), 1833,
79 Stat. 286, 291, 296, 302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. See id. § 1862(a)(1) (excluding medical care "not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis
or treatment of illness or injury").
3. Glenn Hackbarth, Chairman of MedPAC, concisely summarized the flaws of Medicare
payment: "Care coordination is rare, specialist care is favored over primary care, quality of care is
often poor, and costs are high and increasing at an unsustainable rate... [FFS] payment systems
reward more care, and more complex care, without regard to the value of that care." Reforming the
Health Care Delivery System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, I I I th Cong.
1 (2009) (statement of Glenn M. Hackbarth, Chairman of the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission).
4. Amanda Cassidy, Health Policy Brief Site-Neutral Payments, HEALTH AFF. (July 24, 2014),
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/briefpdfs/healthpolicybrief_ 121 .pdf.
15:1 (2015)
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admissions, but has not discouraged use of expensive technologies and has resulted
in cost shifting to private payers5 and site shifting of Medicare-reimbursed
procedures to other locations such as ambulatory care and physician offices.6 Other
reforms, such as the introduction of a fee schedule to rationalize physician payment
and the attempt to control volume by a sustainable growth rate mechanism, have
been abysmal failures.
7
The Affordable Care Act initiated a large number of measures to address
problems associated with FFS payment methodology. These include efforts to
correct specific shortcomings of the physician fee schedule and other payment
mechanisms. Other initiatives include pilot programs and demonstrations to test
moving provider reimbursement, which is under traditional Medicare, from unit
payments to global or bundled payments for services. For example, under the title
"Improving Payment Accuracy,"8 the Act directs the Secretary of HHS to regularly
review fee schedule rates, focusing especially on those with the fastest growth and
strengthening the Secretary's ability to adjust rates found to be misvalued or
inaccurate.9 Also notable is a provision adding a "value-based payment modifier"
to fee schedule payments under Part B. 10 Beginning in 2017, this adjustment will
reward or penalize physicians based on the relative value of the care they provide
5. See Allen Dobson et al., The Cost-Shift Payment 'Hydraulic': Foundation, History, and
Implication, 25 HEALTH AFF. 22, 27 (2006); Austin B. Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost-Shift? A
Review of the Evidence, 89 MILBANK Q. 90 (2011); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Many Prices Paid to
Providers and the Flawed Theory of Cost Shifting: Is It Time For a More Radical All-Payer System?,
30 HEALTH AFF. 2125, 2127 (2011).
6. See Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn 't Worked, 101 GEO.
L.J. 519, 541 (2013) (deeming prospective payment a "qualified failure" with modest effects on costs
or how physicians practice medicine).
7. See Thomas L. Greaney, Controlling Medicare Costs: Moving Beyond Inept Administered
Pricing and Ersatz Competition, 6 ST. Louis J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 229 (2013) [hereinafter Greaney,
Controlling Medicare Costs] (discussing the failure to address collective action problems in the
volume performance standard originally relied upon to control the amount of procedures and the
political impediments undermining the sustainable growth rate mechanism). See also Reviewing the
Work Relative Values of Physician Fee Schedule Services, in MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY
COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 133-50 (Mar. 2006) (explaining how
CMS' reliance on the American Medical Association's Relative Value Update Committee, which is
dominated by specialists, has caused the fee schedule to over-weigh specialty procedures and
undervalue primary care).
8. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3131-602, 124 Stat. 119,
427-538 (2010).
9. Id. § 3134 ("Misvalued Codes Under the Physician Fee Schedule").
10. See Value-Based Payment Modifier, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
Payment/PhysicianFeedbackProgram/ValueBasedPaymentModifier.htmIl (last visited Dec. 10,
2014).
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using measures of adherence to recommended clinical processes.1 The ACA also
seeks to fill the void of quality oversight by adding new regulatory measures such
as a penalty for hospitals ranking in the top twenty-fifth percentile for rates of
hospital infections. 1
2
In what is potentially the most far-reaching change, the Act initiates several
programs designed to move away from the FFS concept. For example, the ACA
requires the Secretary of HHS to establish, test, and evaluate a five-year pilot
program "for integrated care during an episode of care ... around a hospitalization
in order to improve the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care
services,"'3 and further directs the Secretary to make a recommendation no later
than January 1, 2016 as to whether to expand the pilot program. 4 CMS has begun
to test four different "bundled" payment models in a three-year program that allow
such payments to be made to physicians, hospitals, and post-acute care providers.
Under bundled payment, a single payment is made for an "episode of care"-i.e.,
a defined set of services for treating a patient's medical condition or performing a
major surgical procedure that are delivered by designated providers in specified
health care settings and often time periods. '5 Other programs are also underway to
develop payment modalities such as gainsharing and acute care bundling that
encourage and reward integration of care. 
16
B. Medicare Advantage
Although Congress has allowed private organizations to provide Medicare
services to beneficiaries for over thirty years, Medicare managed care has proved
11. See Robert A. Berenson & Deborah R. Kaye, Grading a Physician's Value-The
Misapplication of Performance Measurement, 369 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2079 (2013) (endorsing the
concept of value based reimbursement but criticizing the measurements to be used in the program).
12. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3008 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2012)).
13. Id. § 3023 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4a (2012)).
14. Id. See generally, Melanie Evans, Interest Surges in Medicare Bundled Payment Initiative,
MODERN HEALTHCARE (July 31, 2014),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140731/NEWS/307319832 (reporting CMS will add
4,100 providers to 2,400 already exploring use of bundled payments).
15. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3023 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-
4(c)(3)(C)) (2012). Under this program, CMS and providers set a target payment amount for a defined
episode of care. Applicants propose the target price, which would be set by applying a discount to
total costs for a similar episode of care as determined from historical data. Participants in these
models are paid for their services under Medicare fee-for-service payments, but at a negotiated
discount. At the end of the episode, the total payments would be compared with the target price.
16. See Innovation Models, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID INNOVATION,
http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/index.html#views=models (last visited Oct. 30, 2014)
(providing descriptions of demonstrations underway at CMS including the Medicare Hospital
Gainsharing demonstration, the Acute Care Episode (ACE) demonstration, and the Physician
Hospital Collaboration Demonstration).
15:1 (2015)
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something of a roller coaster ride. The Tax Equity and Financial Responsibility
Act of 198217 authorized capitated payments to health maintenance organizations
calculated at ninety-five percent of county fee-for-service expenditures under Part
A and Part B. Born in the belief that private plans could be more efficient and
innovative than traditional Medicare and the promise that significant savings
would be shared with beneficiaries in the form of added benefits or reduced
premiums, the program attracted health maintenance organizations (HMOs),
which grew rapidly in limited areas of the country. Enthusiasm for managed care
eventually dampened when it became apparent that the success of HMOs was in
part attributable to their ability to enroll a disproportionately healthy cohort of
beneficiaries.18 Congress responded with the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
renaming the program Medicare+Choice, instituting a risk adjustment
methodology that paid less to plans with relatively healthier enrollees, and severely
limiting annual increases in program payments to plans. 19 The law proved to be an
overreaction, as many plans, unable to earn profits, abandoned the program. 20
In 2003, Congress again sharply reversed course, adopting the Medicare
Modernization Act,2' which once again renamed the program (Medicare
Advantage) and provided significantly enhanced payments to attract greater
participation by private plans. In addition, the new law added regional preferred
provider organizations and private FFS plans to expand the availability of
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans to previously unserved or underserved areas,22
and adopted new bidding and risk sharing regulations. In the end, the law achieved
its unstated but transparent goal of promoting managed care enrollment by
overpaying private plans.23 By 2009, MA plans were receiving payments in excess
of 114% of FFS and some of the newly-configured MA plans were not even
17.42 U.S.C. §1395mm(a)(1)(C) (2006).
18. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT
POLICY (Mar. 2002).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-23(a)(3), 1395w-23(c) (2006). See generally Marsha Gold,
Medicare+Choice: An Interim Report Card, 20 HEALTH AFF. 120, 126 (2001) (cataloguing the
shortcomings of the program following passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997).
20. See id. at 126 (discussing the effects of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 on Medicare
managed care).
21. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-
173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23 (2006)).
22. See Marsha Gold, Medicare's Private Plans: A Report Card on Medicare Advantage, 28
HEALTH AFF. w4 1, w42 (2008). By 2008 all Medicare beneficiaries had multiple MA choices. Id.
23. A corollary goal of undermining traditional Medicare can be seen in Speaker Newt
Gingrich's justification for voucher plans that he hoped would make traditional Medicare "wither on
the vine." Gingrich on Medicare, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1 996/07/20/us/politics-gingrich-on-medicare.html; see Greaney,
Controlling Medicare Costs, supra note 7, at 229.
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designed to provide integrated care.24
With passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, Congress once again
reversed course, cutting back substantially on overpayments to MA plans25 and
instituting a quality-based bonus program to reward plans demonstrating superior
performance.26 But in yet another mid-course correction, the significant cuts in
MA plan payments mandated by the ACA were substantially mitigated when the
Obama administration initiated a demonstration program that allowed 90 percent
of plans to receive bonuses and took other steps that ultimately gave back half of
projected savings from cuts to MA plans.
27
Although the MA payment model relies on plans submitting bids, the process
diverges from a strictly competitive model in that payments to MA plans are
determined by comparing each plan's bid to a statutorily determined local
benchmark. Importantly, that benchmark is calculated based on the Part A and Part
B fee-for-service spending in each county in which a plan proposes to operate. Plans
bidding below the benchmark receive their bid plus a "rebate" equal to a fixed
percentage-50 percent, 65 percent, or 70 percent, depending on the plan's quality
rating-of the difference between the bid and the benchmark. Those bidding above
the benchmark-a rare occurrence-receive the benchmark but must require that
each plan enrollee pay a premium equal to the difference between the bid and the
benchmark. Once the rebate amounts are determined, plans must return the rebates
to their enrollees in the form of supplemental benefits or lower premiums. As noted
above, the ACA made important adjustments to the bidding framework by lowering
plan benchmarks to levels closer to the cost of enrollees in traditional Medicare in
each county, setting relatively lower benchmarks in counties with high FFS
Medicare costs, and setting relatively higher benchmarks in counties with lower FFS
costs.28 Nevertheless, because benchmarks continue to be based in part on historic
24. See Brian Biles et al., Medicare Advantage in the Era of Health Reform: Progress in
Leveling the Playing Field, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 5 (2011),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Issue-Briefs/201 1/MariMedicare-Advantage.aspx.
25. The highest paid counties will bid against benchmarks set at 95% of FFS and the lowest at
115%, with the others in between, so that by 2017, CMS will set payments at a national average of
101% of FFS costs. Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,(2014),
http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage-fact-sheet/.
26. Plans that perform well on quality scores under the Star Rating program can offset some of
the reduction with additional bonus payments. See Gretchen Jacobson et al., Medicare Advantage
Star Rating and Bonus Payments in 2012, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2011),
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8257.pdf.
27. JAMES COSGROVE & EDDA EMMANUELLI-PEREZ, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-12-964T, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE: QUALITY BONUS PAYMENT DEMONSTRATION HAS DESIGN
FLAWS AND RAISES LEGAL CONCERNS 4 (2012); see Meghan McCarthy, Medicare Advantage and the
'Potomac Two-Step,' MORNING CONSULT (Apr. 13, 2014),
http://themorningconsult.com/2014/04/medicare-advantage-and-the-potomac-two-step.
28. Under the revised bidding formula, benchmarks will be 95% of fee-for-service (FFS) costs
15:1 (2015)
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spending and are subject to annual increases based on the growth in Medicare
spending,29 the bidding process does not encourage plans to compete as vigorously
as one in which payments are based on the average of plans' bids.
30
II. DISTINGUISHING THE THREE MODELS
The three payment models differ in many important respects relevant to
devising synchronization policy discussed later in this article. This section first
outlines the attributes that distinguish the models and the subsequent section
highlights four dimensions of particular relevance to policy development.
First, Medicare applies distinct payment methodologies to each model. As
shown in the following chart, provider payment under traditional FFS Medicare
pays for individual services based on government-set prices. ACO providers are
reimbursed using an identical methodology but receive a bonus or penalty
depending on their ACO's overall level of spending, which is measured against the
historical FFS costs of their beneficiaries, and the ACO's performance on CMS
quality measures. Medicare Advantage plans are paid a capitation amount
determined by the difference between their bids and the FFS spending in the
counties in which the plan operates subject to adjustment based on quality metrics.
Each payment model is subject to regulatory controls though the nature and extent
of those requirements differ significantly.
per enrollee for the counties in the top quartile of FFS costs; 100% for countries in the second highest
quartile; 107.5% for the third highest quartile and 115% for the bottom quartile. Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3201,24 Stat. 119,442 (2010) (codified as amended
in 42 U.S.C. §1395w-23(j)(2012)).
29. See Robert A. Berenson, From Politics to Policy: A New Payment Approach in Medicare
Advantage, 27 HEALTH AFF. w156, w160 (2008).
30. See Greaney, Controlling Medicare Costs, supra note 7 (contending that "ersatz
competition" in MA bidding lacks the requisite incentives to replicate competitive process). A
provision in the Senate's version of the Affordable Care Act that was removed in the reconciliation
required competitive bidding that set payments based on the average bid. See Austin Frakt, Medicare
Advantage Competitive Bidding: The Political Failure of a Good Idea, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr.
12, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/20 1 /April/04121 OFrakt.aspx.
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TABLE 1: COMPARING THE THREE PAYMENT MODELS
15:1 (2015)
Traditional Accountable Medicare
Fee-for-Service Care Advantage
(FFS) Organizations (MA)
Medicare (ACOs)
" Pays for * Pays for * Pays risk-
individual individual adjusted
services at services at set capitation
set payment payment rates payments per
Medicare rates (FFS) enrollee
Program * Plus bonus * Based on
Payment payments/pen- MA
alty based on benchmarks
spending & & bids
quality targets * Star Quality
Bonus
" Medicare 9 Same as under e Part A & B
benefit FFS * Extra
package (Pt. * Beneficiaries benefits if
A&B) "attributed" to the plan bid
" Any ACOs is less than
participating * Providers the MA
Benefits and provider informally benchmark
Requirements e Beneficiaries encourage e Catastrophic
buy staying within coverage
supplemental the ACO e Limited
coverage network of
providers
e Beneficiaries
must enroll
A second important distinction concerns the allocation of risk. No financial
risk is assumed by providers under traditional Medicare. By contrast, MA plans
are required to assume risk annually by virtue of accepting fixed capitated
payment. ACOs under the MSSP may choose not to accept downside risk in the
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initial year of operation; in subsequent years they must accept risk as measured by
their improved cost and quality performance over the previous year. The MSSP
ACO model requires that risk be measured by the ACO's performance with respect
to its own cohort of assigned beneficiaries. Risk is determined for MA plans based
on their bids against a benchmark based on all beneficiaries in the counties in
which they operate. Thus, in choosing in which models to participate, providers
encounter significant differences in the amount of risk they must assume.
The three models also differ in the way they provide incentives to lower costs
and who gets to share in savings achieved. Beneficiaries in MA plans share savings
in the form of extra benefits or reduced premiums or cost-sharing, while plans
presumably gain more business with lower costs as they are able to offer more
attractive products in the MA market. By contrast, savings are distributed to ACOs.
Under FFS, providers in low cost areas that achieve savings for the Medicare
program receive no benefits although the beneficiaries they serve are indirectly
rewarded in that services provided by low cost providers will entail lower co-
payments.
Other differences among the payment models affect beneficiaries in important
ways. For example benefits are not uniform across models. While beneficiaries are
entitled to receive the identical package of Part A and Part B services from
traditional Medicare, MA plans, and ACOs (with the exception of hospice
benefits), MA plans that bid below their benchmarks are required to provide extra
benefits and/or reduced premiums. In addition, MA plans must provide
catastrophic coverage unavailable under traditional Medicare.3 1 Although not
required to provide specific additional benefits, ACOs must have in place a variety
of quality assurance processes. Due to their responsibility for the full panoply of
care, ACOs also need to have strong incentives to offer cost saving services that
are not reimbursed under traditional Medicare such as social services, phone call
assistance, and other support services
Finally, the models place different constraints on beneficiaries' choice of
provider and on their ability to switch models. Under traditional Medicare,
beneficiaries can receive services from any participating provider, which in most
communities includes the vast majority of all hospitals and physicians. The same
is true for beneficiaries attributed to ACOs; however, their providers have financial
31. Medicare Advantage enrollees have a maximum out-of-pocket limit for all Medicare
covered services of $6,700 and "encouraged" by CMS to be no more than $3,400. Fact Sheets:
Strengthening Medicare Advantage, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (2014),
http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-
04-07.html; see also, Medicare Advantage Spotlight, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2014),
http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicare-advantage-2 014-spotlight-plan-availability-and-
premiums/#LimitsOnOOPSpending.
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incentives to refer them to providers affiliated with their ACO. In addition, most
MA plans are HMOs that limit access to out of network providers. However, some
MA plans adopt a PPO or HMO POS model, which permits access to non-network
providers. Beneficiaries must enroll or dis-enroll for MA plans during limited
annual periods or under special circumstances such as a change in residence. Under
the attribution process, beneficiaries make no election to participate in an ACO
and, hence, have no restrictions on choice of providers. Beneficiaries receive
notice of their attribution to an ACO and, although not allowed to opt out, may
prohibit sharing of clinical data among ACO providers.
III. DIMENSIONS FOR A POLICY FRAMEWORK
As will be discussed in the following section, MedPAC has begun to
investigate the desirability of "synchronizing" policies affecting the three models.
Although the Commission is at an early stage in developing this concept, a core
premise is that Medicare policy should adopt a position of "financial neutrality."
Explaining its rationale, MedPAC's annual report states, "to encourage
beneficiaries to choose the model that they perceive as having the highest value in
terms of cost and quality, the Medicare program should pay the same on behalf of
each beneficiary making the choice."32 However, the heterogeneous
characteristics of the three models and the policies embedded in them evince the
daunting task the agency has undertaken. Synchronization will encounter a number
of widely shared program objectives that may make achieving a "level playing
field" an elusive goal. Below I discuss three important policy goals that will require
careful balancing as payment reform proceeds.
A. Affording Beneficiaries Choice and a Range of Benefits
A laudable feature of Medicare today is that it offers a range of options that
serve the heterogeneous preferences of its beneficiaries. The three models provide
differing mixes of choice and benefits. Traditional Medicare offers practically no
formal limitations on choice of providers, while MA plans constrict choice to
provider panels. ACOs are in an intermediate position, not formally limiting choice
but operating in the background to steer patients to ACO providers. With respect
to benefits, traditional Medicare offers the range of part A and B services. Yet, it
fails to reimburse providers for so-called "non-medical" services and, thus,
undervaluing certain primary care services like cognitive medicine may
underprovide those services. By contrast, MA plans have incentives to provide
32. Synchronizing Medicare Policy Across Payment Models, in MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY
COMM'N. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1,5 (June
2014) [hereinafter MedPAC, Synchronizing Medicare Policy].
15:1 (2015)
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add-on services. They are mandated to provide extra benefits or reduced premiums
and catastrophic coverage unavailable in traditional Medicare, though their
financial incentives may encourage under-provision of care. ACOs again occupy
a middle position, having managed care incentives to provide cost-effective non-
medical and coordinating care services, while also sharing incentives to
underprovide care. Although developed over time in a rather haphazard fashion,
the three payment models thus serve to provide choice and flexibility for a diverse
population.
B. Limiting Subsidies and Disparate Payments
Strong objections to "overpayment" or subsidies for private plans fueled
cutbacks enacted under the Affordable Care Act. As discussed above, the Medicare
Modernization Act enhanced payments to MA plans with the explicit goal of
spurring enrollments. To the extent such payments exceeded the reimbursement
that providers would have received under FFS plus compensation for providing
additional services and assuming risk, CMS payments for MA plans is commonly
seen as a subsidy for private plans.33 Although less widely acknowledged, ACOs
also benefit from the services provided by CMS in the form of billing assistance
and assignment of beneficiaries. By contrast, MA plans must shoulder the costs
associated with soliciting beneficiaries and servicing their accounts. Reforms
aimed at attaining absolute financial neutrality would face the intractable task of
untangling and harmonizing the levels of direct and indirect support the federal
government supplies for participants in each payment model.
Another perceived anomaly is found in payment policies that provide
disparate reimbursement and skew incentives for provider participation. For
example, high cost providers are rewarded with the opportunity to share savings
through ACOs because they can more readily cut costs to their attributed
beneficiaries by eliminating the "low hanging fruit" of their cohort's excess costs.
By contrast, providers that have historically contained costs find it difficult to
33. See e.g. Eliminate Private Medicare Advantage Plan Subsidies, NAT'L COMMITTEE TO
PRESERVE SOCIAL SECURITY & MEDICARE (2009), http://www.ncpssm.org/Document/ArticleID/754.
The extent of this subsidy must take into account differences in the product sold by MA plans. That
is, because they provide extra benefits and more complete insurance, to some extent "extra" payments
made to MA plans in the form of "rebates" compensate for those additional benefits. However extra
benefits received by beneficiaries appears to be only a small proportion of the higher payments. See
Steven D. Pizer et al., Nothing for Something? Estimating Cost and Value for Beneficiaries from
Recent Medicare Spending Increases on HMO Payments and Drug Benefit, 9 J. INT'L HEALTH
FIN. & ECON. 59 (2009) (finding only 14% of added spending on MA plans goes to consumers).
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receive financial rewards for their cost effective practices. Adjustments to the
benchmark applicable to ACOs would of course alter these incentives. However,
the determination of whether to maintain incentives for both high cost and low cost
providers to join ACOs is a judgment that will turn on policy-driven appraisals of
the long term benefits of ACOs as a transformative payment model.
C. Reducing Payment Variations
Decades of research has revealed that Medicare spending varies enormously
across different regions of the country. Recent studies show variations in county-
level FFS spending ranging from a high of $1,300 per month to a low of $500 per
month, with most counties showing variations in the range of $600-800 per month
and with 44 percent of beneficiaries living in the highest spending quartile.
34
Because of the interaction of local FFS and payments to the other two models,
local variations affect the distribution and costs of MA and ACO alternatives in
local markets. For example, MA plans serving markets in which benchmarks were
set higher than local FFS spending unsurprisingly tended to cost more than FFS.
In low cost areas, this phenomenon might be justified as a necessary inducement
for MA plan entry. Early evidence indicates that Pioneer ACOs tended to be
located in higher FFS spending areas but historically have cost less than MA plans.
However, these results are subject to important caveats. Changes in MA
benchmarking will likely change the dynamics among the models as might
proposed reforms of the MSSP ACO program and improvements in ACO
capabilities as they mature and learn from successful models. Equally important,
FFS payment reforms underway35 have the potential to reduce payment variations
and influence payments to the other models. Thus efforts at payment reform must
entail educated guesses about the speed and extent of change in FFS payments.
In sum, payment reform take place against a backdrop of widely agreed
upon policy objectives and other reforms well underway. Next, we consider how
some of the norms that affect payment policy may complicate the task of
synchronization.
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF SYNCHRONIZING PAYMENT POLICY
A. Regulation: Benchmarks, Quality, and Risk Adjustment
All three models are subject to extensive but divergent regulation. MedPAC's
34. MedPAC, Synchronizing Medicare Policy, supra note 32, at 8. See also INST. OF MED.,
VARIATIONS IN HEALTH CARE SPENDING: TARGET DECISION MAKING, NOT GEOGRAPHY (2013)
(reporting significant and persistent variations in spending).
35. See notes 9-17and accompanying text.
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initiative to synchronize policy across the models is rooted in several principles
inherent in its responsibility to advise Congress on payments to private health plans
and providers on issues affecting quality, cost, and access.36 One is "financial
neutrality," the belief that the Medicare program should not subsidize one model
more than another.37 A related concern is that beneficiaries' choice of models
should not be influenced by diverging payment policies, including rules governing
quality and risk adjustment.38
A central consideration underlying the financial neutrality inquiry is the
"benchmarks" used in payment policies for Medicare Advantage plans and ACOs.
Defined as the "level of program spending that will trigger a bonus or penalty" in
the two models, benchmarks are set according to statutory formulas that differ in
several dimensions. For each ACO, the benchmark is the historical FFS spending
on its beneficiaries, i.e. those attributed to it,39 while MA plans bid against a
benchmark based on overall FFS spending in the county in which the plan will
operate.40 Providers being reimbursed under administered (FFS) pricing of course
face no benchmark.
In addition, payment to both MA plans and ACOs are adjusted based on
quality standards that also differ in administration and measurement. MA plans are
rewarded with a higher benchmark for attaining higher quality scores, while ACOs
are penalized by reductions in their shared savings if they do not meet quality
benchmarks. From the beneficiaries' perspective, these distinctions have several
36. About MedPAC, MEDPAC, http://www.medpac.gov/-about-medpac- (last visited Oct. 30,
2014).
37. MedPAC, Synchronizing Medicare Policy, supra note 32, at 5. MedPAC raised concerns
about financial neutrality in its June 2005 Report, which questioned benchmarks for Medicare
Advantage plans that exceeded 100%. See The Medicare Advantage Program, in MEDICARE
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ISSUES IN A MODERNIZED MEDICARE
PROGRAM 59, 79-80 (June 2005) [hereinafter MedPAC, Medicare Advantage].
38. MedPAC, Synchronizing Medicare Policy, supra note 32, at 5.
39. For MSSP ACOs, benchmarks are set on a historical cost spending under Parts A and B for
its beneficiaries, a determination that is based on a retrospective "attribution" of beneficiaries to an
ACO. Beneficiaries who received a plurality of their care from a primary care physician (or in some
cases a non-physician or specialist) are attributed to that provider's ACO. As a result, each ACO's
benchmark determining payment or penalty will be calculated using the three year historical costs,
trended forward, for its beneficiaries. Because of uncertainties and inefficiencies associated with this
process, MedPAC has recommended that CMS exercise its administrative authority to change to
prospective attribution, as is done for ACOs in the Pioneer program. Letter from Glenn M. Hackbarth,
Chairman, MedPAC, to Marilyn Tavenner, Adm'r, CMS 7-8 (June 16, 2014)
(http://www.medpac.gov/documents/comment-letters/comment-letter-to-cms-on-accountable-care-
organizations-%28june- 16-2014%29.pdfsfvrsn=0).
40. Beginning in 2017, the county benchmark for MA plans will be at set at four quartile
levels-95 percent, 100 percent, 107.5 percent, or 115 percent of the FFS rate projected for that
county for the year; quartiles will be based on the relative FFS spending levels among counties during
the preceding year. MedPAC, Synchronizing Medicare Policy, supra note 32, at 8.
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implications. The quality scores for MA plans serve a dual purpose: first, as indicia
of quality that helps beneficiaries select their plans, and second, as an enhancement
of the plan's value because greater rebates to plans must be passed along to
beneficiaries in lower costs or enhanced benefits. In the case of ACOs, payment
adjustments have only the indirect effect of creating incentives for better
performance. Further complicating the picture is the fact that different metrics of
quality metrics are used for adjusting payments to MA plan and ACOs.4 1 Noting
the shortcomings of existing quality measures42 that rely primarily on provider-
based clinical processes rather than outcomes, MedPAC has proposed shifting to
population-based outcome measures.43 However, synchronizing such quality
measurement for FFS payment poses an intractable problem because FFS
providers do not belong to entities capable of coordinating care for a defined
population and have not agreed to do so.
44
The three payment models are subject to a third important form of regulation,
risk adjustment. Risk adjustment plays a critical role in Medicare payment policy
as it serves to counter the well-documented tendency of providers and payers that
assume financial risk for the costs of treating beneficiaries to avoid beneficiaries
expected to incur relatively high medical expenditures and to seek out those likely
to have low costs.45 Medicare adjusts the capitated payments to MA plans by
41. See MedPAC, Synchronizing Medicare Policy, supra note 32, at 14 (recommending use of
same population-based outcome measures for calculating bonuses and penalties for MA plans and
ACOs).
42. MedPAC's principal criticisms of current quality measurement are that (1) it relies too
heavily on clinical process measures that are "weakly correlated with health outcomes" and
reinforces incentives to increase the volume of services, (2) it is administratively burdensome, and
(3) it encourages providers to focus resources on processes being measured and neglect potentially
important means for improving outcomes. Measuring Quality of Care in Medicine, in MEDICARE
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTHCARE
DELIVERY SYSTEM 39, 41 (June 2014) [hereinafter MedPAC, Measuring Quality].
43. Id. at 45-48.
44. MedPAC therefore recommends continued reliance on provider-specific payment policies
for FFS providers that control for quality deficiencies such as reductions in hospital payments for
high readmissions or infection rates. Id. at 14.
45. Reforms in Medicare's risk adjustment system using the CMS-HCC model for adjusting
payments for clinical diagnoses and demographic factors and instituting an enrollment lock in have
achieved some success in reducing incentives for favorable selection. See J. Michael McWilliams,
New Risk-Adjustment System Was Associated with Reduced Favorable Selection in Medicare
Advantage, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2630 (2012). However, MedPAC has concluded that the HCC
methodology "still substantially overpredicts the cost of the least costly beneficiaries and
underpredicts the cost of the most costly beneficiaries" but was unable to find alternatives that
performed better. Improving Risk Adjustment in the Medicare Program, in MEDICARE PAYMENT
ADVISORY COMM'N. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTHCARE DELIVERY SYSTEM
21, 32-33 (June 2014) [hereinafter MedPAC, Improving Risk Adjustment]. It is currently
investigating administrative measures such as penalties for disenrollment of high cost beneficiaries.
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calculating a risk score based on the demographic factors and medical history for
each enrollee relative to the national average that it multiplies by the base rate
payment for the plan. Payment to ACOs adjusts for risk based on the demographics
alone calculated for all beneficiaries attributed to the ACO. MedPAC has indicated
that synchronization may require reducing differences in the methods for risk
adjustment and coding practices for all Medicare beneficiaries.
46
B. Synchronization and Financial Neutrality
As noted MedPAC has begun an investigation of whether and how regulation
of the three payment models might be "synchronized."' 47 It has long advocated
"financial neutrality" between MA and FFS payments, urging in 2005, for
example, that overpayments to Medicare Advantage plans be curtailed and the MA
benchmark be set at 100 percent of local FFS costs.48 However, it has been careful
to qualify its position on financial neutrality by stating that while benchmarks
should be equal across payment models, "equal benchmarks... do not mean equal
payments because payments may be adjusted for quality and other factors."
49
Recent work by the MedPAC staff has involved simulation studies examining the
relationship among the three models and comparing several benchmarks that may
be used. It has concluded that no single payment model would always be the low-
cost model in all situations. Instead, the relative cost of the models will depend on
"regional differences in care delivery, on the effectiveness of MA plans and ACOs
in restraining cost growth, and on decisions regarding how quality bonuses and
risk adjustment factor into the benchmarks."50 This led MedPAC to conclude that
"efficiency can be gained by synchronizing the benchmarks to level the playing
field," thus leaving it to beneficiaries' choice of which model best suited their
needs. 
51
However, the choice of a benchmark has important policy implications. For
example, using local FFS spending as the benchmark for ACOs (as opposed to the
current benchmark which consists of the historical spending for each ACO's
beneficiaries) would encourage ACOs comprised of low cost providers to enter the
program. This is the opposite response seen under existing arrangements where
Id. at 33. See also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-206, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE:
SUBSTANTIAL EXCESS PAYMENTS UNDERSCORE NEED FOR CMS TO IMPROVE ACCURACY OF RISK
SCORE ADJUSTMENTS (2013).
46. MedPAC, Synchronizing Medicare Policy, supra note 32 at 13-14.
47. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
48. MedPAC, Medicare Advantage, supra note 37, at 79.
49. MedPAC, Synchronizing Medicare Policy, supra note 32, at 5.
50. Id. at 12.
5 1. Id.
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high cost ACOs have the incentive to participate and low cost providers do not.
However, as discussed below, using local FFS benchmarks will discourage
participation of MA plans in low cost areas because of the difficulty of "beating"
the locally determined capitation rate. By contrast, setting a benchmark based on
a national average of FFS costs would perversely penalize beneficiaries in low
spending areas, where costs are already low, by chilling the incentives facing MA
plans and ACOs. Given the wide variation in spending in the country, any
benchmark that is chosen will have significant effects on the incentives providers
face and distributional consequences for beneficiaries. Finally, an underlying
policy issue is whether the deeply flawed FFS spending serve as a benchmark.
Benchmarks calculated on the basis of bidding experience or a calculation of an
efficient level of spending would better serve program objectives by making each
ACO's success hinge on its ability to be cost efficient in relation to its local market.
C. Divergent Background Norms
A more fundamental question remains. Why should Medicare policy pursue a
level playing field at all? The myriad differences in the characteristics of the
models discussed in the previous section reflect an amalgam of policies underlying
those differences. These divergent norms, lurking in the background of Medicare
payment policy, suggest that any attempt to level the playing field encounters a
bumpy terrain of widely shared policy objectives that may prove impossible to
reconcile.
Integration and FFS Payment. Virtually all policy analysts agree that a central
failing of the American health care system is the absence of coordination among
providers. Particular fault rests with traditional fee-for-service Medicare, which
rewards providers for volume and ignores the potential benefits accruing from
integration of services. Indeed, many sections of the ACA are designed to shift the
focus of traditional Medicare by testing global and value-based payments and
fostering new delivery arrangements.52 In addition, Medicare payment policy
decisions take on added importance because of their influence on the organization
of delivery systems serving the commercial sector. Those who view it as an
important objective of Medicare payment policy to move delivery in the direction
of encouraging efficiency-enhancing integration might well argue that the
synchronization project should adjust the neutrality principal to encourage the
proliferation of ACOs and Medicare Advantage plans.
52. See. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL. HEALTH LAW (3d ed. 2014) §§. 8-16 - 8-17,; U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Services, Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program,
http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Leaming-Network-
M LN/M LN Products/downloads/HospitalVBPurchasingFactSheetICN907664.pdf.
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Equity and Regional Variation. As discussed above, the variation in health
care costs across regions of the country might cause significant variability in the
availability and generosity of Medicare Advantage plans under synchronization. 
53
For example, lowering the benchmark to (or below) fee-for-service levels might
result in some areas being deprived of the extra benefits provided by MA plans.
5 4
Thus, from the consumers' standpoint, it would be inequitable if benchmark
adjustment deprived some Medicare beneficiaries of the enhancements that come
with MA enrollment. Likewise, providers find inequity in the imbalance of
opportunity under certain payment arrangements. For example, ACOs have
generally grown up in areas where high cost providers can more readily lower costs
for their attributed beneficiaries and share in the savings they achieve. However,
providers that have maintained lower costs in other regions without forming ACOs
are not rewarded for their economizing efforts and are less likely to form ACOs.
Were synchronization to set ACO benchmark at local FFS levels, it would address
this perceived inequity but would give rise to criticism that benchmarks did not
provide adequate incentives for participation of high cost providers. More
generally, a related set of concerns focuses on the wide disparities in payment
across regions. This view emphasizes the need to reduce inequity in the wide
variation in Medicare spending across regions and advocates leveling federal
provider reimbursements, though allowing for some differences based on some
localized factors.
Competition and Innovation. Not widely appreciated is the interplay of
Medicare payment policy and the competitiveness of provider markets in the
commercial sector. Although administered pricing under Medicare does not
differentiate among providers based on their market leverage, provider market
competition has a significant effect on hospital Medicare margins. Examining the
effect of hospital concentration on Medicare payments, MedPAC has found that
high hospital margins on private-payer patients tend to induce more construction
and higher hospital costs and that, "when non-Medicare margins are high, hospitals
face less pressure to constrain costs, [and] costs rise."55 These factors, MedPAC
53. See Robert E. Moffit & Alyene Senger, Progress in Medicare Advantage: Key Lessons for
Medicare Reform, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 4, 2014),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/progress-in-medicare-advantage-key-lessons-for-
medicare-reform (reducing the MA benchmarks as provided under the ACA may result in reduction
in the number of plans around the country).
54. As MedPAC Chairman Hackbarth characterized the argument, "People... in areas of the
country where there are low fee- for-service costs are.. .not crazy by any stretch.. what they're saying
is that we pay equal taxes in Medicare... In some parts of the country, people are getting a whole lot
more health care services for it than in other parts of the country." Transcript of Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission Public Meeting, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION 93-94 (Mar. 7,
2014), www.medpac.gov/documents/0314medpac-transcript.pdf.
55. Report to the Congress: Assessing Alternatives to the Sustainable Growth Rate System xiv,
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observes, explain the counterintuitive phenomenon that hospital Medicare margins
tend to be low in markets in which concentration is highest, while margins are
higher in more competitively structured markets.56 Further, low "Medicare
margins" attributable to expense preference behavior-the tendency of firms with
market power to allow costs to increase 57-by dominant hospitals may translate into
higher Medicare costs because updates to hospital administered pricing under
prospective payment are sensitive to these margins. Finally, as CMS noted in
promulgating its Final Rule on ACOs, because monopolists face regulatory
constraints in raising prices, they often reduce the quality or amount of inputs for
their services.58 In this way, inadequate competition in the private sector may lead
to diminution in quality of care and access for Medicare beneficiaries. Hence
Medicare payment policy encouraging formation of MA and ACOs serves to
support the beneficial effects of the dynamic between Medicare and private
markets. 59
Beneficiary Choice and Preserving Traditional Medicare. The widespread
support for traditional Medicare among the public and politicians suggests that
payment reform will not encroach on the choice that option provides. In addition,
traditional Medicare operates as an important constraint on cost increases in
alternative models. Most obviously, the benchmarks for MA plans and ACOs limit
the ability of dominant hospitals and physician groups to exercise their market
power vis-a-vis Medicare. In markets with limited provider competition, the
availability of traditional Medicare may also encourage somewhat more
competitive bidding from MA plans and cost control from ACOs due to the
freedom of choice afforded to beneficiaries by traditional Medicare. Further, MA
plans' contract prices with hospitals are strongly influenced by FFS Medicare
pricing. A MedPAC study demonstrated that MA plans pay hospitals the same,
significantly discounted rates that FFS Medicare pays.60 Hospitals have no
alternative, higher paying alternatives because FFS rates are administratively
determined, and regulations prohibit them from charging out of network rates for
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION (2009),
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/mar09_entirereport.pdf.
56. Id.; see also Stensland et al., Private- Payer Profits Can Induce Negative Medicare Margins,
29 HEALTH AFF. 1045, 1048-49 (2010).
57. See Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency, 56 AM. ECON. REV.
392 (1966).
58. Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable
Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802,67,806-961 (Nov. 2, 2011).
59. Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and
Competition Policy, 47 Az. ST. L. J. I (2013).
60. Transcript of Medicare Payment Advisory Commission Public Meeting, MEDICARE
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION 93-94 (Nov. 1, 2014),
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/november-2012-meeting-transcript.pdf.
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emergency services.
CONCLUSION
The trajectory of the three payment models is anyone's guess. Some hazard
predictions that all ACOs will eventually morph into MA plans; others suggest hat
MA plans cannot best traditional Medicare on cost, so in the absence of overly
generous benchmarks, Medicare managed care will flounder; still others see
payment reform of FFS Medicare inevitably pushing providers to integrate and
eventually migrating to ACOs or MA plans. MedPAC's proposal to avoid
subsidizing any model appropriately backs away from an explicit endorsement of
any one model. However, its aspiration that regulators and Congress will endorse
a truly level playing field is likely to be frustrated given the powerful norms that
have driven Medicare policy in the past.
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